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I. Introduction and Summary 
 
While the Federal Communications Commission carries a diverse policy portfolio, one issue in 
particular remains at the top of consumers’ collective mind year after year: reducing the number 
of unwanted robocalls. By one measure, 54.6 billion spam calls were placed to American mobile 
phones in 2019 – that’s 4.5 billion each month, or approximately 14 calls monthly for each man, 
woman, and child in the United States.1 The FCC reports that unwanted calls generate 60 percent 
of all consumer complaints that the agency receives each year.2 
 
Robocalls have even become pernicious and pervasive enough to draw the Supreme Court’s 
attention. Earlier this month, the Court decided Barr v. American Association of Political 
Consultants, Inc. In that case, the Court struck down a portion of the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act (TCPA), a 1991 statute intended to protect consumers from robocalls, because it 
violated the First Amendment.3 Three days later, the court granted certiorari in a second case, 
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, which involves interpretation of an ambiguous statutory definition 
within the TCPA.4 These follow on the heels of a third case, PDR Network LLC v. Carlton & 
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Harris Chiropractic Inc., which was decided last year and involved a conflict between the FCC 
and the judiciary about a different TCPA provision. 
 
While the three cases come in very different postures, all are in some way wrestling with the 
statutory text – text that was awkward when written thirty years ago and has grown increasingly 
problematic over time. As technology advances and the world has grown ever more connected, 
the TCPA has proven increasingly incapable of solving the robocall problem. Today’s robocalls 
often originate overseas and present as disguised numbers, meaning that the TCPA’s private 
right of action offers little deterrence against the rising tide of unwanted calls. Yet the act’s 
ambiguous and outdated language has nonetheless driven an explosion in litigation against 
companies far from the telemarketers Congress targeted. Much of this litigation has been brought 
by creative trial lawyers who stretch the likely meaning of the statute in ways that defy common 
sense and undermine consumer protection. 
 
Recent FCC initiatives have shown the possibility of technical solutions to the robocall problem. 
Initiatives such as default call blocking, better call authentication through the STIR/SHAKEN 
framework, and targeting of gateway providers as the entry points for foreign robocalls represent 
efforts to identify and eliminate the drivers of modern robocalls. Congress should update the 
TCPA to reflect the realities of the modern telecommunications marketplace, and consider 
focusing on technological solutions, rather than litigation, to protect American consumers.  
 
II. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 
 
Though technological advances have exacerbated the problem, unwanted telephone calls are not 
a new phenomenon. Nearly thirty years ago, consumers complained about the rise in calls by 
telemarketers who used automatic dialing equipment to deliver pre-recorded messages via 
telephone.5 As Senator Fritz Hollings put it on the Senate floor, “[c]omputerized calls are the 
scourge of modern civilization. They wake us up in the morning; they interrupt our dinner at 
night; they force the sick and elderly out of bed; they hound us until we want to rip the telephone 
right out of the wall.”6 In response, Congress passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 
which (as Hollings, a bill sponsor, explained) was “purely targeted at those calls that are the 
source of the tremendous amount of consumer complaints at the FCC and at the State 
commissions around the country – the telemarketing calls placed to the home.”7  
 
The TCPA placed significant limitations on outbound calls. Among other restrictions, it prohibits 
the use of an “automatic telephone dialing system” (or autodialer) to call wireless phones or any 
service for which the called party is charged for the call.8 The law also prohibits calls to 
residential lines using an artificial or prerecorded message unless the called party has consented 
to the call, or the call is made for emergency purposes,9 and limits unsolicited advertising by fax 
machine.10 Importantly, while Congress gave the FCC authority to implement the act,11 it also 
created a private right of action: recipients of an illegal call may receive $500 in statutory 







III. The Supreme Court’s TCPA Trilogy 
 
A. PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc. 
 
The decades-old statute was hardly a model of good legal draftsmanship even at the time it was 
written. And while technological advances have exacerbated the statute’s obsolescence, it was 
one of the more arcane provisions that first drew the Supreme Court’s attention in late 2018.   
PDR Network, LLC, produces the Physicians’ Desk Reference, a manual that compiles the uses 
and side effects of prescription drugs.13 The book is distributed to health care providers for free, 
funded by pharmaceutical companies that pay to include their products in the manual.14 In 2013, 
PDR Network announced that it would publish a new e-book version of the manual, and notified 
physicians via fax how to reserve a copy for free. 
 
One of the recipients, Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, brought a class action alleging that the 
message violated the TCPA’s prohibition on unsolicited fax advertisements. The statute defines 
an “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or 
quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that 
person’s prior express invitation or permission.”15 This would seemingly exclude the PDR fax, 
which provided an informational resource for free and offered nothing for sale or purchase to 
recipients. This was the conclusion of the district court, which dismissed the case.16 But the 
court’s rationale clashed with an earlier FCC order stating that faxes that “promote goods or 
services even at no cost, such as free magazine subscriptions, catalogs, or free consultations or 
seminars, are unsolicited advertisements” because “free publications are often part of an overall 
marketing campaign to sell property, goods, or services.”17 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision did not resolve this ambiguity. Rather, it addressed an ancillary 
legal question raised by this confluence of events: whether the Hobbs Act required the district 
court to adopt the FCC’s interpretation.18 The Hobbs Act grants the courts of appeals exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine the validity of FCC final orders.19 Carlton & Harris Chiropractic argued 
that this provision required the district court to follow the interpretation in the FCC order. But 
the court remanded for consideration of whether the FCC order was a legislative or merely 
interpretative rule, and whether PDR Network had “prior” and “adequate” opportunity to seek 
judicial review of that order.20 Four justices concurred in the judgment, and would have found 
that the Hobbs Act does not bar a defendant from challenging the agency’s prior interpretation in 
an enforcement action.21 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch went further, to suggest that such a broad 
reading of the Hobbs Act might be an unconstitutional infringement on the judicial power.22 
 
B. Barr v. American Ass’n of Political Consultants, Inc. 
 
The Court’s second foray into TCPA litigation stems from Congress’s questionable effort to 
exempt the government’s interests from the statute. In 2015, the Bipartisan Budget Act created 
an exemption from the TCPA for calls “made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by 
the United States.”23 The plaintiffs sought to make robocalls not to collect government debt but 
to solicit for political purposes, such as conducting polls, asking for donations, and organizing 
get-out-the-vote efforts.24 They argued that the government-debt exemption favored some speech 
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over others in violation of the First Amendment, and thus the court should strike down the 
robocall ban entirely.25  
 
The Supreme Court rejected this too-cute-by-half ploy, though its opinion was surprisingly 
fractured. Justice Kavanaugh’s plurality opinion found that the statute favored some speech over 
others on the basis of content, and therefore the strict scrutiny standard applied on judicial 
review.26 Because the government could not identify a compelling government interest, as 
required by the strict scrutiny standard, the government debt ban was unconstitutional.27 But 
rather than striking the statute entirely, the plurality severed the government debt exception from 
the rest of the statute, which corrected the constitutional infirmity.28 Justices Gorsuch and 
Thomas agreed that the government debt ban failed to satisfy strict scrutiny but would not have 
severed it.29 Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Ginsburg would have found that, because speech 
relating to collection of debt is commercial speech, the government debt exemption was subject 
to the less strict intermediate scrutiny standard. They would have upheld it, but nonetheless they 
agreed with the plurality’s severability analysis.30 And Justice Sotomayor would have found the 
statute failed intermediate scrutiny but supported severability.31 
 
Thus, the box score read 6-3 that Congress impermissibly favored government debt collection 
over other speech, and 7-2 that the appropriate remedy was to sever the exemption. “As a result,” 
said Justice Kavanaugh, “plaintiffs still may not make political robocalls to cell phones, but their 
speech is now treated equally with debt-collection speech.”32 
 
C. Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid 
 
Though the first two cases dealt with constitutional questions, the most recent TCPA case, which 
involves a matter of statutory interpretation, has the potential to be the Court’s most 
consequential. Like many tech companies, Facebook uses text messages to alert its users of 
potential security risks, such as when an account is accessed from an unrecognized browser.33 
Noah Duguid alleges that he received multiple such notifications from Facebook via text, even 
though he does not have a Facebook account.34 Duguid filed a class action arguing that Facebook 
used an autodialer to send a message to his wireless phone without his consent in violation of the 
TCPA.35 
 
Facebook’s potential liability turns on the convoluted statutory definition of an autodialer. Under 
the statute, 
 
[t]he term “automatic telephone dialing system” means equipment which has the 
capacity— 
(A)to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or 
sequential number generator; and 
(B)to dial such numbers.36  
 
The key question that the Court must address is how to parse the first prong of this awkwardly-
worded definition. Does the phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” modify 





To clarify any ambiguity, we rearticulated the definition of an ATDS: “equipment 
which has the capacity—(1) to store numbers to be called or (2) to produce 
numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator—and to dial 
such numbers automatically.”37 
 
This means that any device that has the capacity to store telephone numbers and dial them 
constitutes an impermissible autodialer – including Facebook’s notification system, as alleged by 
Duguid.38 
 
While this seems like the type of esoteric minutiae that only professors and other telecom law 
nerds could appreciate, the ramifications of this holding are significant. Under the Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation, the potential scope of TCPA liability is breathtaking. Thousands of 
companies notify customers by phone of suspicious account activity, using automated messages 
to numbers preprogrammed and stored for use in the event of a security incident. Moreover, two-
factor authentication, using a telephone number to confirm a user’s identity, is the gold standard 
for identity verification. Anytime such a system maps the wrong number to an account, as is 
alleged in Duguid – perhaps due to input error, or perhaps because a number has changed hands 
since the account was created – the company could face liability, which deters use of some of the 
most effective cybersecurity tools. 
 
But the potential harm goes far beyond data security. As Facebook argued (and the Ninth Circuit 
seemingly acknowledged), every smartphone “has the capacity to store telephone numbers” and 
“dial such numbers.”39 That would mean that every smartphone is an autodialer – and every 
smartphone owner is a potential TCPA tortfeasor. This is important because one need not 
actually make an automated robocall to run afoul of the statute. The TCPA makes it unlawful “to 
make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express 
consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system” to, inter alia, wireless 
phone numbers.40 The statute focuses on whether an autodialer was used, not how it was used. 
As courts have explained, “a system need not actually store, produce, or call randomly or 
sequentially generated telephone numbers, it need only have the capacity to do it.”41 If a 
smartphone counts as an autodialer, then any call from a smartphone – even a traditional, live 
voice call – to a wireless number violates the statute, absent consent or emergency. 
 
Despite this absurdity, it is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court will resolve this case. On 
the one hand, as the D.C. Circuit has mused, “[i]t cannot be the case that every uninvited 
communication from a smartphone infringes federal law, and that nearly every American is a 
TCPA-violator-in-waiting, if not a violator-in-fact.”42 In addition to the practical consequences 
of its ruling, there is some textual evidence that undermines the Ninth Circuit’s ruling. Congress 
placed a comma between the phrase “store or produce telephone numbers to be called” and 
“using a random or sequential number generator,” which suggests the latter phrase is meant to 
modify the entirety of the former. 
 
On the other hand, the alternative reading proposed by Facebook also makes little sense: number 
generation and number storage are different activities, so it makes little sense to describe a 
device with the capacity “to store telephone numbers…using a random or sequential number 
6 
 
generator.” A clause delineating prohibited methods of number generation is more closely linked 
to the act of producing a number than storing it.43 A textualist court could stress the relationship 
between the words “generator” and “produce” to uphold the Ninth Circuit’s reading of the 
statute, despite the consequences. 
 
IV. The Obsolescence of the TCPA 
 
While few if any statutes are free from ambiguity, the Supreme Court’s trilogy of TCPA cases 
highlights the multitude of problems presented by this statute in particular. Many provisions, 
such as the unsolicited fax provision in PDR Network and the autodialer definition at issue in 
Duguid, were poorly written when passed. As Duguid demonstrates, these difficulties have 
grown over time, as the fax machines and landlines that animated the statute have diminished in 
use, replaced by innovative new technologies that fit poorly into the analog-era statutory 
framework. And even when Congress does try to speak clearly, as it did in the 2015 amendment 
to the TCPA, the Barr decision shows the potential mischief that can occur when trying to 
legislate in the communications field in a way that passes constitutional muster. 
 
But even these cases only scratch the surface of the TCPA’s obsolescence. On a more 
fundamental level, the act – and in particular its central enforcement mechanism, the private right 
of action – is doing little to solve the robocall problem. Americans receive billions of unwanted 
calls each year, and the number is rising. The FCC acknowledges that the vast majority of these 
robocalls violate the TCPA.44 But the statute is powerless to stop them, because they largely 
originate offshore and are anonymized. The tremendous reduction in the cost of communication 
in the digital age, coupled with the development of technology to disguise a caller’s identity, has 
allowed the foreign robocall industry to flourish in way that the statute’s sponsors could never 
have imagined. Because of the difficulties involved with finding these perpetrators and bringing 
them to justice in U.S. courts, these entities are effectively judgment-proof: the threat of 
litigation is simply not a deterrent to their irritating activities. 
 
In the meantime, courts are increasingly burdened by litigation abuse by creative lawyers who 
stretch the statute in ways the sponsors equally could not have imagined. According to 
WebRecon, TCPA filings have exploded in the last decade, growing tenfold from 351 cases in 
2010 to 3267 in 2019 (and that figure is down from the high of 4638 cases in 2016).45 Despite 
the COVID-19 pandemic, 1911 cases have been filed between January and May 2020.46 Given 
the average settlement of a TCPA class action is roughly $6.6 million, it’s no surprise that it’s 
drawing the attention of plaintiffs' bar. But many of these cases aren’t brought against 
robocallers, but legitimate businesses that Congress never sought to target. 
 
Then-Commissioner Ajit Pai chronicled one case against the Los Angeles Lakers who offered 
fans a chance to text a message to the team to be placed on the Jumbotron. When the Lakers 
acknowledged receipt of each message with a text indicating that not all messages would be 
selected, they were sued for violating the statute.47 In 2018, the Philadelphia Inquirer featured a 
21-year-old who made a career of manufacturing TCPA suits, through such deceptive practices 
as placing an order, freezing his credit card payment so the company would call back, and then 




More recent experience suggests that technology, rather than litigation, offers a more effective 
remedy for modern robocalls. In 2019, the FCC clarified that despite their obligations as 
common carriers, telephone companies could block calls, based on reasonable analytics, as a 
default position for customers, which allowed consumers easier access to call-blocking 
technology.49 In conjunction with Congress, the agency shepherded the adoption of the 
STIR/SHAKEN framework, which improves caller ID authentication and makes it more difficult 
for a calling party to disguise its identity.50 
 
And in response to the spike in robocall traffic during the COVID-19 pandemic, the government 
pioneered an innovative public-private partnership that targeted the gateway providers that serve 
as “middlemen” connecting overseas robocalls to American telephone numbers. These gateway 
providers, identified as robocall importers based on call volume and traffic patterns, were given 
48 hours to stop importing illegal robocalls. If they failed to do so, American carriers were 
permitted to block all traffic coming from the offending network.51 Unlike TCPA lawsuits, these 
technical measures target the specific factors that have helped robocalls proliferate – the ease of 




Justice Scalia once described the 1996 Telecommunications Act as “not a model of clarity” but 
instead “in many important respects a model of ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction.”52 
The same certainly could be said for the TCPA. Like the local telephone company provisions of 
the 1996 Act, the TCPA has outlived its usefulness and is ripe for revision. Its continued 
existence in its current form creates more harm than good, as trial lawyers wield it against 
legitimate businesses that Congress never intended to punish. Regardless of the outcome of the 
Duguid case, Congress should revisit the act and update its twenty-nine-year-old definitions to 
reflect the modern telecommunications marketplace. At a minimum, it should eliminate the 
relatively ineffective private right of action and instead continue the modern trend of technology, 
rather than litigation, as our primary tool in the fight against illegal robocalls. 
 
* Daniel A. Lyons, a Professor at Boston College Law School, is a Member of the Free State 
Foundation's Board of Academic Advisors. The Free State Foundation is an independent, 
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